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CASE NOTES
alternative would be to rule that the surety can elect to stand on his rights
of subrogation; or to file a financing statement, thereby waiving his rights of
subrogation, as held in the Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. case, and electing to
stand on his legal rights under the Code. A third alternative, and one with
much to commend it, is for the court to hold that there is no need to look
beyond the statute to determine the surety's right. The Code has provided
an adequate legal remedy by which sureties, by following proper procedures,
can establish legal security interests having absolute priority over the trustee
in bankruptcy and almost certain priority over all other creditors of the de-
faulting contractor. It would seem that the "equitable subrogation" doctrine,
designed to provide the surety with a remedy where none was previously
provided by common law or statute, is superfluous. 1'
The Pearlman case provides an uncertain basis for granting the surety
"equitable subrogation" in retained percentages which the United States
holds as a stakeholder in jurisdictions in which the Uniform Commercial Code
is not in effect. In Code jurisdictions, no reason is apparent why the "equi-
table subrogation" doctrine should not be abandoned.
FORREST W. BARNES
Communications—FCC—Unfair Competition by Community Antenna
Service.—Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc. 1—In an action commenced on
antitrust grounds by a community antenna operator, the defendant, a local
television station, filed a compulsory counter-claim and applied for a pre-
liminary injunction against plaintiffs. The defendant station alleged that it
had exclusive contract rights to the "first run" of major network programs in
the Twin Falls, Idaho area. It further alleged that the activities of the plaintiff
community antenna operator, in picking up and distributing these programs
to its subscribers at the same time they were broadcast by the station, con-
stituted tortious interference with these contract rights and was a means of
unfair competition. HELD: The contractual arrangements made by the local
station with the television networks which granted the limited right of first
call exclusively upon the programs of the latter is a valuable property right,
protectable by injunction from the tortious interference and unfair compe-
Stat. 1029 (1940), as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1958), which authorizes the assignment
of the contractor's contract claims against the Government to a bank or other financial
institution as security for the extension of the financing necessary to enable small con-
tractors to undertake government contracts. Such assignments were previously null and
void as against the United States. Financing institutions would be increasingly reluctant
to extend such credit if the major source of security in the event of default and bank-
ruptcy of the contractor, i.e., the retained percentages, is held to belong to the surety
regardless of whether it has taken the steps necessary to perfect its interest, which would
have served to put the bank on notice of that interest.
84 A similar policy is found in the analogous provisions dealing with "preferred
creditors" in Bankruptcy Act, § 60a(6), 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §
96a (6) (1958), which provides: "The recognition of equitable liens where available means
of perfecting legal liens have not been employed is declared to be contrary to the policy of
this section."
211 F. Supp. 47 (D. Idaho 1962).
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tition of the community antenna operator. The court further held that its
determination of this controversy was not pre-empted by the Federal Com-
munications Act. In a supplementary opinion this right was held to extend
not merely to programs which the local station broadcasted simultaneously
with the network affiliates but also to "delayed" broadcasts, and syndicated
and feature films.
The community antenna service companies, (CATV), originated in com-
munities where for the most part either because of their distance from stations
or particular geographic location, satisfactory television reception was un-
available.2 When this situation exists there is no conflict because CATV
provides a larger audience than would otherwise be available. It is able to
provide such service to its subscribers by means of a master antenna located
at some advantageous location and through microwave facilities. After re-
ceiving the signal from a distant station, CATV brings the program to its
subscribers by means of a cable connected to the subscribers' home viewing
sets. CATV is not a "broadcaster" within the meaning of the Federal Com-
munications Acts and is therefore not subject to the act's provisions regulating
broadcasters. To the extent that CATV utilizes the microwave facilities of a
common carrier it is indirectly subject to the FCC licensing of these carriers.'
Since the defendant is the sole television station in the community, there
can be but one program broadcast at a time from Twin Falls, whereas the
choice of three additional programs from the Salt Lake City network affiliate
stations is available to CATV subscribers. Because the local station's pro-
gram is identical with that of one of the Salt Lake City stations, some of the
Twin Falls viewers are not reached by the local station's commercials. A
second instance where the local station objects to the activities of CATV
occurs when "delayed" broadcasts or syndicated and feature films are picked
up by CATV in advance of the date of the scheduled local broadcast. Here
too, the commercials upon which the local station depends for revenue might
not reach the subscribers.
The history of the present litigation began in a suit in federal court
against the present plaintiffs, Cable Vision, Inc. and Idaho Microwave, Inc'
The former is the CATV operator while the latter is a microwave company, a
common carrier, whose facilities are used by the CATV operator, both under
common control. This first action was brought by the three network affiliated
stations for declaratory and injunctive relief from alleged unfair competition
and unjust enrichment. The theory of recovery advanced by the stations was
within the doctrine of International News Serv. v. Associated Press.° The
2
 In 1959 it was estimated that there were some 700 CATV serving about two mil-
lion persons. FCC 25th Ann. Rep. 62 (1959) .
3 Section 3, 48 Stat. 1065 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1958),
4 The Commission denied the application by a microwave company to install a
relay to convey television signals for a CATV operator in Carter Mountain Transmission
Corp., No. 12931, FCC, Feb. 16, 1962.
This case is pending on appeal, Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, No. 17089
(D.C. Cir. 1962).
5 International Broadcasting & Television Corp. v. Idaho Microwave, 196 F. Supp.
315 (D. Idaho 1961), noted, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1523 (1961) and 50 Geo. L.J. 171 (1961).
6 248 U.S. 215 (1918). For a comment dealing with this aspect of the present case
see 65 W. Va. L. Rev. 69 (1962).
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court denied relief because no exclusive license arrangement which would
grant a property right to the stations was sufficiently documented and "the
relationship between the public, defendant's microwave relay and plaintiff's
broadcasts are not similar to or fairly comparable with the relationships in
the International News case."7 The court did not deny that CATV "had
reaped where it had not sown," within the meaning of International News,
but it refused to grant relief chiefly because the network affiliates and CATV
were not competitors. In the present case there is little doubt that CATV
and the local station are vying for the same audience.
The contract upon which the local station relied is one common to the
industry and permitted by the FCC regulations.° Briefly, it provides the
local contracting station with a limited right of first refusal to network pro-
grams as against the other stations in the community. In regard to this con-
tract the court stated: "Certainly, KLIX [the local station] should not be
permitted to assert any right of exclusivity against a community antenna
more broadly than it could be asserted against the network organization or
another station."0
However, the court found that the arrangement created a property right
in the local station to the extent that this option provision was exercised. The
activities of CATV were found to lessen the value of this "exclusive" right.
It did concede that Congress could have, had it chosen, expressly "occupied the
field" and inaction on its part should not necessarily be deemed to amount to
license on the part of the states.'° However, it was determined that Congress
had not occupied the field.
The court in recognizing the pre-emption problem declared:
In cases of obvious conflict with the Federal Communications Act
and federal policy stemming from it . . . state law, common law or
statute, is abrogated to the extent that it stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of the Congress.11
The court was convinced that there was no "obvious conflict" but found it
necessary, because it was applying Idaho law, to ascertain whether in fact
any conflict existed which would oust it of jurisdiction.
In examining the scope and operation of the Communications Act the
court acknowledged that in at least one case a court had stated that the act
constituted a plenary exercise of the power of the national government to
occupy "fully the field of television regulation." 12 The court, finding no
conflict, refused to accept these broad assertions without qualification, point-
ing to several instances where a station licensed by the FCC was held to be
a proper party in litigation before state and federal courts. 13 It must be
7 Supra note 5, at 328.
8 FCC Regulations § 3.658(b), 47 C.F.R. § 3.658(6).
9 211 F, Supp. at 53.
10
 Id. at 56.
L Ibid.
12 Dumont Labs. v. Carrol, 184 F.2d 153, 156 (3d Cir. 1950).
13 FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940). The court in the
instant case noted that the Supreme Court in United States v. Radio Corp. of America,
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remembered that the alternative open to the court, had it decided the pre-
emption doctrine precluded it from deciding the case, would have been the
recognition of a jurisdictional "no man's land" in which no court or agency
could act'4
The court, since it ultimately relied on the International News doctrine,"
may be assumed to have been aware of the cautions expressed by Mr. Justice
Brandeis in his dissent." There, Mr. Justice Brandeis, although recognizing
the capacity of the common law for growth and sympathizing with the plight
of the plaintiff whose news releases had been used by the defendant without
authority, advised that the creation or recognition by courts of new private
rights may work serious injury to the general public unless the boundaries of
these rights are clearly defined and cautiously guarded. This, he said, was a
job for the legislature and the administrative agencies for "Courts are ill-
equipped to make investigations . . ."' 7
 where these new rights are involved.
In International News the Court was not faced with the additional pre-
emption" problem faced here, but the cautions expressed by Mr. Justice
Brandeis should have indicated to this court what was to be expected when
dealing with this very sensitive area.
The contract, which the court decided in this case created the local sta-
tion's private rights, was, as indicated,' 9 one common to the industry. Since
there is but one station in the community involved in the present case the
contract may be regarded as having extremely dubious value.2°
The expressed objectives of the Communications Act include the making
"available . . . to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-
wide, . .. communication service .. . ."21
 The decision here, furthers this
objective with regard to television stations. With respect to the CATV service
companies the opposite is true. This would seem to frustrate a main purpose
of the policy of the act for CATV, while not subject to the act, does aid in
providing the desired coverage. 22
 It would seem that the propagation of tele-
vision programs should not depend on the adoption or non-adoption of the
International News doctrine state by state. The instant court admitted that
the doctrine has not received universal acceptance. 23
358 U.S. 334, 350 (1958), had stated that the Federal Communications Act was not a
"pervasive regulatory scheme" and that the primary jurisdiction doctrine did not pre-
clude an antitrust action against an FCC licensed broadcaster. In the present case the
primary jurisdiction doctrine had no application.
14 As an example of the "no man's land" problem, see San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garman, 359 U. 5.,236 (1959).
15 Supra note 6.
19 This was reflected in this court's prior opinion supra note 5, at 322.
17 Supra note 6, at 267.
18 Supra note IC
18 Supra note 8.
20 This was further demonstrated when the present court noted: "Whe present
national policy clearly contemplates that there will be broadcast stations licensed by the
network organizations in different communities but within the same general service area
whose simultaneous broadcasts of network programs may overlap both communities with-
out violation of any valid network station exclusivity arrangement." 211 F. Supp. at 53.
21 Communications Act § 1, 48 Stat. 1069 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 151. (1958).
22 Ibid.
23 Supra note 5, at 322, 323.
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That portion of the injunction relating to delayed broadcasts, and syn-
dicated and feature films, may work a serious hardship to CATV because, as
the court indicated, the rights of local stations in these programs extends for
a period of twenty-one days after the network broadcast?' Thus the local
station may assert its right of first-call anytime within this twenty-one day
period; and, until this right is exercised and the choice made known, CATV
may not safely pick up any of these broadcasts. This problem may not prove
as serious a hardship as anticipated if, as is the custom, the local station
makes known in advance the schedule of its anticipated broadcasts. This is
not to minimize, however, the undoubted impact of this sweeping injunction
on CATV.
The court did refer to the views expressed by the FCC, 25 which indicated
a desire to subject CATV to its rules. These rules require the consent of the
originating station before a program may be reproduced by another broad-
caster.26 Congress has consistently refused to extend control over CATV to
the FCC.27
It is submitted that the result of the decision in the present case subjects
CATV to a more stringent requirement than even the FCC advocates, for
now CATV is prohibited from picking up these programs even if it has ob-
tained the permission of the broadcaster. This demonstrates what prompted
Mr. Justice Brandeis' admonition of caution on the part of courts when deal-
ing with this sensitive problem. The decree effectively limits the available
selection of television programs to the people of Twin Fails and prefers an
artificial property right to the interest of the general public. It remains to be
seen whether Congress anticipated this reaction to its refusal to extend the
authority of the FCC.
LEWIS ROSENBERG
Contributor
Constitutional Law—Due Process—Blacklisting—Agency Action with-
out a Hearing.—Kukatusb Mining Corp. v. SEC. 1—A nonresident alien
corporation having no assets and doing no business in the United States
sought a preliminary injunction against the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion to have its name removed from the "Canadian Restricted List." 2 The
corporation alleged that (I) its name was placed on the list without any no-
24 211 F. Supp. at 54.
25 Id. at 55. See also FCC 28th Ann, Rep. 65, 66 (1962).
25 Ibid.
27 211 F. Supp. at 55. Two recent bills were H.R. Rep. No. 6840, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1961), S. Rep. No. 1044, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). See also, Inquiry into the
Impact of CATV, T.V. Translators, T.V. "Satellite" Stations and T.V. "Repeaters" on the
Orderly Development of T.V. Broadcasting, 26 F.C.C. 403 (1959).
1 309 F.2d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
2 The Canadian Restricted List is a list of Canadian companies whose securities the
Commission has reason to believe have been or are being distributed in the United States
in violation of the registration requirements of the Securities Act. of 1933. See SEC
Securities Act Release No. 3632 (1956). For SEC policy on deletions, see Release No.
4240 (1960).
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